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People with mental illness engage in characteristic disorder-associated behaviors. A person with obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) washes their hands dozens or hundreds of times a day. A person with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is distractible and disorganized and fails to complete their assigned 
tasks. A person with alcoholism drinks to excess, with resulting harms to work and family. How are we to 
make sense of why these people do what they do?  
A standard position is that those with mental illness cannot help but do what they do. They have a 
disorder and what they do is not a matter of choice. We would not blame a person with acromegaly for 
having too much growth hormone; so too we should not blame a person with ADHD for distractedly 
forgetting to go to an appointment.  
There are two major shortcomings of this simple “disease model” of mental illness. First, it seems 
to require two different models to explain action. Most purposive actions are explained in the usual way in 
terms of the ordinary workings of our motivational psychology—beliefs, desires, deliberation, etc. Some 
purposive actions, the disorder-associated actions of those with mental illness, get explained in a quite 
different way. For these special cases, a “disease-based” process is invoked, though the particulars of how 
this process works are not filled in with any detail. Splitting up explanations in this way, especially without 
providing details on how the second kind of explanation is supposed to work, seems ad hoc. Second, while 
the person with acromegaly has no ability whatsoever to (directly) control their growth hormone level, not 
so for the person with a mental disorder. For example, if one were to put a gun to the head to the person 
with OCD, they would straightaway desist from washing their hands.  
Observations such as these have fueled an alternative perspective that sees mental illness not as a 
disease, but as a matter of purpose and choice. This “volitional” view has a long history. It is visible in 
Foucault, Laing, and Szasz (Szasz 1997; Foucault 1988; Laing 1960). It is also seen in newer critiques by 
Gene Heyman, Hannah Pickard, and Carl Hart (Heyman 2010; Pickard 2012; Hart 2014). The economist 
Bryan Caplan offers a particularly clear articulation of this volitional position.1 Using key ideas from 
consumer theory, Caplan distinguishes constraints on actions from preferences for actions. He argues 
physical illnesses produce constraints on one’s actions. Mental illnesses do not; they are best understood in 
terms of volition, albeit in the context of extreme preferences that are out of step with societal norms.  
My aim in this chapter is to offer a systematic response to the volitional view of mental illness. The 
core of my argument is that theorists who support the volitional view operate with a too simple model of 
human motivational architecture. They view the human mind as having a decision theoretic structure: We 
have various desires, they differ in strength (reflecting strength of preference), and we always do what we 
 
1 Caplan, Bryan. 2006. “The Economics of Szasz: Preferences, Constraints and Mental Illness.” Rationality and Society 18 (3): 
333–66. My interest in Caplan’s article was spurred by Scott Alexander’s discussion on the Slate Star Codex Blog 
(https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/01/15/contra-contra-contra-caplan-on-psych/). 
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most prefer. I argue the human mind instead has a regulatory control structure. We not only have desires 
(or similar spontaneous states; I use the term “desire” to refer to all these states for the time being), we have 
regulatory mechanisms that enable us to modulate or suppress our desires. The presence of regulatory 
mechanisms introduces the possibility of constraints: if regulation is limited in some way, then certain 
“lesser” desires that do not reflect what we most prefer may still manifest in action. This is in fact what 
happens, I argue, in many mental disorders—these disorders arise precisely where the limits of control are 
breached (in interestingly different ways in different disorders). If this picture is right, then a person’s 
disorder-associated behaviors might not reflect what they most prefer to do, but rather what they are 
constrained to do.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. Section 2 distinguishes two models of motivational 
architecture, the Decision Theory model and the Regulatory Control model. Section 3 adopts the 
Regulatory Control model and sketches a general picture of several major mental illnesses. They are, I 
argue, conditions that arise due to limits on control. Section 3 returns to the key distinction between 
preferences and constraints. It is argued that the limits on control explanation of mental illness is a better 
overall fit to the data than the volitional view.  
 
 
2. Two Models of Motivational Architecture 
 
2.1. The Decision Theory Model 
There is a picture of motivational architecture that is extremely common in philosophy, economics, and 
certain social sciences. The picture resembles a psychologized version of rational choice theory, and it goes 
like this: People have various desires directed at different things. These desires differ in terms of strength 
(Mele 1998). That is, there are certain motivational properties of these desires in virtue of which they are 
ordered in terms of motivational “potency” (barring ties—I ignore this complication going forward). Action 
selection systems are configured so that they are sensitive to the strength properties of one’s overall set of 
desires, and the desire that sits atop the strength ordering becomes the basis for action. The explanations for 
action supplied by this model are simple and intuitive, for example: Joe’s desire to go to the movies is 
stronger than his desire to do anything else (go to the park or go to the mall, etc.), and so Joe goes to the 
movies.  
This picture of motivational architecture, which I will call the Decision Theory view is so 
widespread in philosophy and economics, it hardly gets noticed or mentioned. It simply serves as the 
background default view for understanding agents. But the view implies two principles that are worth 
pausing to highlight.  
First, because of the way the Decision Theory architecture links one’s strongest desire to action, 
the architecture implies that what an agent does will conform to the following law-like generalization, 
which has been dubbed the Law of Desire:  
 
Whenever a person acts intentionally, they do what they are most strongly motivated to do at the 
time.2  
 
The second principle, which is a direct consequence of the first, is what we can call the Law of Revealed 
Desire:  
 
2 See Mele 2003; Sripada 2014; Barnes 2019 for discussion. The principle as stated is susceptible to counterexamples but these 
counterexamples are not relevant for our present purposes. Thus, I prefer this simpler formulation for the present purposes. 
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Whenever a person acts intentionally, what they do reveals what is their strongest motive.  
 
That is, when a Decision Theory agent acts, we can “read off” from their behavior what they most want. 
Extending this second principle to mental illness, the volitional view naturally follows. Suppose someone 
touches a doorknob and washes their hands a dozen times in a row, and now they are washing their hands 
(intentionally) for the thirteenth time, causing serious skin fissures and substantial pain. The second 
principle implies that washing their hands this thirteenth time is what they most wanted. To be sure, they 
have unusual wants, or what Caplan calls “extreme preferences”. But, if we assume a Decision Theory 
architecture correctly describes human motivation, then since this is what they intentionally do, we can be 
confident this is what they most wanted to do.  
 
2.2. Regulatory Control Model 
I now turn to an alternative picture of motivational architecture. As we go about ordinary life, various kinds 
of spontaneous tendencies arise. Our attention is grabbed by features of the environment. Habitual action 
tendencies are elicited. Memory items are spontaneously called to mind. We are “pulled” to think about 
certain topics. A hallmark of spontaneous tendencies such as these is that they operate as a default—the 
spontaneous tendencies will manifest in action unless something intervenes to block them.3 
Such intervention is possible because humans have unique abilities for top-down regulation. In what 
follows, I discuss these regulatory abilities in two steps. First, I discuss regulation of simple, brief 
spontaneous tendencies of the kind just considered. Second, I discuss regulation of more complex, 
temporally-extended states such as emotions and cravings. 
The regulation of simple, brief spontaneous tendencies is called cognitive control, and it is extensively 
studied in cognitive and clinical neuroscience. A standard method involves study of “conflict tasks”. The 
hallmark of these tasks is that they set up a conflict between the simple spontaneous tendencies previously 
discussed and a second type of motivational state, one’s goals. These are relatively stable motivational states 
that are closely connected to one’s conscious reflective judgments. Here are three examples of conflict 
tasks:  
 
Stroop Task (Stroop 1935) – On each trial, subjects are shown a color word (“red”, “blue”) which is itself 
printed in an ink color. Subjects are asked to state the ink color of the word on all trials. On congruent 
trials, the word’s meaning and ink color match and it is relatively easy to get the right answer. On 
incongruent trials, the word’s meaning and ink color are discrepant, and subjects must exert control 
over their spontaneous tendency to read the word, in order to select the correct response. 
 
Go/No Go Task (Donders 1969) – On each trial, subjects see a letter on the screen. Subjects are asked to 
press a button only if the letter is not “X” and withhold the button press if it an “X”. Most of the letters 
are not “X”, for example 90% not “X” to 10% “X”.  This skewed ratio leads to the development of a 
habit for button pressing. On trials where the stimulus is not “X”, the button pressing habit facilitates 
correct responding. On “X” trials, subjects must suppress this habit. 
 
Think/No Think Task (Anderson and Green 2001) – During a practice session, subjects are trained to 
recall pairs of words (e.g., ROACH – ORDEAL; GUM – TRAIN). In the test session, they are given 
the first member of the pair. They are told that if the word appears in green ink, they are to think about 
 
3 In Sripada (forthcoming), I discuss the nature of these simple spontaneous tendencies in some detail. 
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the paired word. If the word appears in red ink, they must not think about the paired word. This 
requires that they suppress the spontaneous tendency to recall the associated word.  
 
These tasks illustrate that based on their goals, people can perform control actions—rapidly executed intra-
psychic actions that inhibit, suppress, or otherwise modulate various kinds of simple, brief spontaneous 
tendencies. Different kinds of control actions target different psychological systems. As a result, people can 
control a diverse array of simple, spontaneous tendencies, including those associated with attention, 
memory, thought, belief formation, evaluation, and action selection.  
Turn now to complex, “hot”, temporally-extended spontaneous states such as emotions and cravings. 
We can regulate these states as well in accordance with our goals. Theorists call this capacity various names 
including “effortful control”, “volitional regulation”, and “emotion regulation” (Gross 1998; Rothbart et al. 
2003; Sripada et al. 2014). This kind of regulation is illustrated vividly in fMRI studies of craving regulation 
(Brody et al. 2007; Kober et al. 2010; Hare, Camerer, and Rangel 2009). In these studies, subjects, for 
example smokers or dieters, are shown pictures of stimuli (cigarettes, indulgent food, etc.) that are known 
to elicit strong cravings. On some trials, they are asked to simply experience the cravings. On other trials, 
they are asked to regulate the cravings and reduce their intensity. This is usually accomplished by attention 
control actions (directing attention away from pictures) and thought control actions (intentionally inhibiting 
certain thoughts or bringing to mind competing thoughts). These studies typically find:  
1) elevated activation in reward-related regions during experience trials;  
2) elevated activation in “executive” regions during regulation trials; and  
3) an inverse relationship between activity in executive regions and reward regions (suggesting the 
former is inhibiting the latter). 
 
It is an interesting question how regulation of complex spontaneous states such as emotions and 
cravings relates to cognitive control, i.e., regulation of the simple, brief spontaneous tendencies I discussed 
earlier. I discuss this issue in detail elsewhere (Sripada forthcoming). In short, I think the two are related as 
whole and part: When a person regulates complex states, they perform a sequence of cognitive control 
actions directed at simple, brief spontaneous tendencies. I put this issue aside for our present purposes. 
I need a general term to refer to this broad collection of spontaneous states, either simple or complex, 
irrespective of whether they pertain to belief, memory, thought, or action selection. I refer to them all as 
“pulses”. I also need a term to describe different forms of goal-directed regulation, spanning cognitive 
control over simple, brief states and more complex forms of regulation over complex states. Going 
forward, I refer to them all as “regulatory control”, or “regulation” for short. 
Recall the two principles that characterize the Decision Theory agent, the Law of Desire and the Law of 
Revealed Desire. Critically, they need not hold in a Regulatory Control agent if one additional condition is 
met: regulation is limited. If regulation is in some way inefficient, weak, or fallible, then an agent can do 
things that they themselves do not most want to do4, in violation of the Law of Desire. This will happen 
when three conditions hold:  
 
1) A person’s strongest overall desire is to do one thing (e.g., pay attention to a lecture),  
2) They experience spontaneous pulses to do something else (e.g., to notice the ticking of the clock or 
to mind wander onto some meaningless topic).  
 
4 Importantly, what an agent “most wants” is determined by motivational properties of desires, not by observing which desire 
actually manifests in action. See Mele 2003; Sripada 2014 for further discussion. 
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3) Top-down regulation is in some way limited, allowing spontaneous pulses to manifest in action 
(recall that pulses are motivational defaults and thus will be the basis for action unless they are 
regulated).  
 
When these conditions hold, the person will act on pulses rather than on what they most want, in violation 
of the Law of Desire. It follows that what they do also fails to reflect what they most want, in violation of 
the Law of Revealed Desire.  
Now, the details here are complex because with a Regulatory Control agent, there are different, 
somewhat independent sources of motivation arising from the states that I have been calling goals and 
pulses. Thus, the notion of “what an agent most wants” is more challenging to define: Is it one’s strongest 
goal? One’s strongest pulse? Can their respective strengths even be compared? I do not want to get bogged 
down in these details.5 It suffices for our purposes to take note of the fact that with a Regulatory Control 
agent, even if they have the sincere goal of doing one thing, due to limitations on regulatory control, they 
can still end up doing something else.  
 
2.3. Humans have a Regulatory Control Architecture 
There is extensive evidence, reviewed elsewhere (Botvinick and Cohen 2014; Cohen 2017; Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, and Baddeley 2012), that human motivational architecture has a regulatory control structure, 
and that is what I will be assuming going forward. Notice, though, that even if the Regulatory Control 
model is correct, the Decision Theory model remains useful. For example, in most ordinary contexts 
where there is no need for regulation, or where regulation is so easy it operates flawlessly, then the 
Decision Theory model and Regulatory Control model will yield similar behavioral predictions. So, the 
Decision Theory model represents a simplification that works fairly well for day-to-day purposes. 
However, and this is critical, the two models do come apart in some contexts, and mental illness, as I will 
presently argue, is a striking example. 
 
 
3. Mental Illness and Dyscontrol 
Having introduced the Regulatory Control model of motivational architecture, I now want to fill in the 
details of how, given this architecture, regulatory control fails in ways relevant to mental disorders. I refer 
to a state in which the limits of control are breached as a dyscontrol state. At a highly general level, all 
dyscontrol states arise from a mismatch between regulation efficacy and pulse efficacy, which in turn arises 
from one of three possibilities: an elevated “load” of pulses, a decrease in the person’s regulatory capacities, 
or both. Once we move past this generalization, however, and look at specific mental disorders, we find a 
variety of types of mismatches that are operative. These mismatches involve different types of pulse states 
(e.g., attentional, emotional, doxastic), different types of decreases or impairments in regulatory capacities, 
and different types of environmental contexts in which the pulse/regulation mismatches unfold. I will 
discuss four disorders to illustrate this variety. Along the way, I highlight certain Control Limiting Factors 
that arise in these disorders that illuminate specific and interestingly different pathways by which the limits 
of control are breached. An important theme that emerges in what follows is that the Control Limiting 
Factors that are relevant to psychiatric disorders involve “extended limits”—limits observable only across 
days, months, and even years.  
 
 
5 I discuss this issue in some detail in Sripada (2014). 
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3.1. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
Individuals with OCD have obsessive thoughts, which are typically directed at characteristic themes (e.g., 
contamination), and these thoughts arouse substantial anxiety and tension. They additionally have repeated 
urges to perform behaviors related to these obsessive thoughts, for example urges to wash their hands. 
Importantly, these thoughts and urges do not just happen occasionally, for example a few times a week or 
several times a day. Rather, they typically occur with much greater frequency: dozens to hundreds of times 
a day, often occupying a significant portion of the day. 
Consider an individual OCD thought (e.g., the thought that one’s hand is contaminated) or an 
individual OCD urge (e.g., the urge to wash one’s hand). Each one of these is readily susceptible to 
regulation. The person can use the regulatory repertoire discussed in the previous section to redirect 
attention, suppress problematic thoughts, inhibit inappropriate action tendencies, and so on. Regulation 
will tend to fail, however, if a person experiences densely recurrent thoughts and urges throughout the day, 
day after day, month after month. Under these circumstances, regulation starts to become too burdensome 
for the person.6  
One kind of burden is experiential. The exercise of top-down regulatory capacities is associated 
with a distinctive effortful phenomenology that is aversive or otherwise negatively valenced (Shenhav et al. 
2017). Thus, spending significant stretches of one’s day engaging in top-down regulation of thoughts and 
urges burdens the person with prolonged dysphoric feelings.  
A second kind of burden arises from opportunity cost. Top-down regulation is a member of a 
larger set of cognitive functions called executive functions (Diamond 2013). Other members include 
planning, deliberation, and high-level problem-solving. Executive functions are underpinned by a shared, or 
importantly overlapping, set of brain mechanisms that exhibit limited capacity—engaging these executive 
mechanisms for one purpose entails, for the most part, giving up their use for other purposes.7 It follows 
that if a person must engage in top-down regulation for significant stretches of their day, they must pay 
substantial opportunity costs in foregoing a range of other valuable executive activities—planning, 
deliberation, problem-solving—that they could have otherwise undertaken.  
In short then, the Control Limiting Factor that operates in OCD involves cumulative burden. No 
thought or urge in the disorder is, by itself, particularly hard to control. But when we consider them in 
their temporal totality—that is, when we consider the cumulative burden of having to regulate all of these 
densely recurrent thoughts and urges over extended stretches of time, the burden on the person is excessive 
and regulation predictably falters.  
The obsessional thoughts and urges in OCD illustrate a more general phenomenon that I claim is 
found in most mental disorders. We see in OCD three key features: 1) a massive population of pulse-type 
states; 2) the pulses are in some recognizable sense abnormal; 3) the presence of these abnormal pulses is a 
long-term feature of the person’s psychology. Going forward, I refer to this cluster with a convenient short-
hand name: “CAPPs”, for chronic aberrant populations of pulses. Giving the phenomenon a name will, it is 
hoped, make it easier to recognize just how ubiquitous it is across a wide range of psychiatric disorders. 
 
2.2. Attention-Deficity/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
 
6 I discuss burdens of regulation in OCD in Sripada (forthcoming). 
7 There is substantial evidence, especially from neuroimaging, of a single domain-general executive network (Duncan and Owen 
2000; Niendam et al. 2012; Cole and Schneider 2007). The limited capacity of this network is supported by a number of lines of 
evidence, see Baddeley 1996; Kurzban et al. 2013 for partial reviews. 
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In ADHD, we see CAPPs, but rather than obsessive thoughts and impulses, the CAPPs pertain to 
attention.8 As we transact with the environment, features of the environment “call out” for our attention 
(Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Serences et al. 2005): a whisper in the hallway, the text message that may 
have shown up on one’s phone, one’s own internal spontaneous musings and mind wanderings. This is true 
for all individuals, with or without ADHD—attentional pulses impinge on the psyche day in and day out. 
Most of these attentional pulses do not present much of a problem because we can regulate them, 
thus staying on task and avoiding inappropriate distraction. Moreover, unlike OCD, regulating attentional 
distractors is not particularly effortful or dysphoric, and thus it does not create a cumulative burden on the 
person. In ADHD, however, a problem arises because there is a regulation/pulse mismatch: either 
attentional pulses are too frequent or regulation efficacy is diminished9, leading to a higher than typical 
failure rate in which inappropriate attentional pulses more frequently “get through”. To be clear, individuals 
with ADHD can regulate attentional pulses, and indeed they succeed most of the time. The problem they 
face is instead statistical. The modern world is unforgiving in placing demands on our attention; tasks and 
projects at school and at work require unerring focus to get done well, or get done at all. A higher error 
rate in regulating attentional distractors is enough to create mistakes, forgetfulness, and disorganization—
the core symptoms of ADHD. The main Control Limiting Factor that is operative in ADHD is fallibility. 
The point probability of successfully regulating each attentional pulse remains quite high. But because 
attentional pulses are so ubiquitous, the person still experiences regular errors, which in turn produce 
serious negative academic, occupational, and interpersonal consequences.10  
 
3.3. Major Depressive Disorder 
The hallmark of major depression is the presence of the emotion sadness—not mild sadness that is 
temporary, but severe sadness that is persistent (i.e., on most occasions for an extended duration). 
Emotions such as sadness produce a multitude of effects on one’s psychology that are mediated by pulse-
type states, as I have argued elsewhere in detail (Sripada forthcoming). Here are some of sadness’s effects 
(Freed and Mann 2007; Hybels et al. 2009; Cipriani et al. forthcoming; Gaddy and Ingram 2014): one’s 
attentional patterns are changed—negative or potentially threatening features of the environment now 
spontaneously draw one’s attention. One’s spontaneous interpretations change—ambiguous or neutral 
events are now interpreted in a negative or pessimistic light. One’s thoughts change—negative memories 
about the past or pessimistic prospections about the future spontaneously enter one’s mind. One’s action 
tendencies change—there is a pervasive sense of fatigue that makes doing even basic things feel 
overwhelmingly effortful. In short, then, depression is a condition that involves chronic alterations in pulses 
arising from multiple psychological systems; that is, it involves CAPPs.  
As in the other cases, these pulses associated with attention, belief, thought, or action can be 
regulated. For example, a person can suppress a negative memory or force themselves to get out of bed on 
any particular occasion if supplied with sufficient incentives. The relevant question, however, is whether in 
real world circumstances where such salient incentives are absent and these problematic pulses arise nearly 
continuously, can an ordinary person without specialized training in higher-order control regulate them? 
The answer is “no” and for multiple reasons. One factor is deference. Ordinary people’s default position is to 
 
8 I am focusing here on ADHD, inattentive type, the most common type in adults with ADHD. A broadly similar account could 
be given of ADHD hyperactive type and ADHD impulsive type, where the role of attentional pulses is replaced by motoric pulses 
and reward-seeking/appetitive pulses, respectively. 
9 There are few attempts to distinguish which of these two factors predominates in ADHD (cf., Friedman-Hill et al. 2010). 
However, at least some individuals with ADHD have more wide-ranging difficulties with executive functions suggesting that for 
them, the top-down factor is more heavily implicated.  
10 I discuss fallibility in the context of cumulative risk of relapse in addiction at length elsewhere (Sripada 2018). 
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accept their spontaneously-formed beliefs and impressions. It is rare for people to take a meta-cognitive 
stance and check carefully whether the way things seem corresponds to the way things actually are. A 
second factor is vigilance failure. Without specialized training in sustained meta-cognitive monitoring, an 
ordinary person cannot stand at guard monitoring and regulating their own ongoing beliefs, impressions, 
and thoughts continuously. A third factor is lack of regulatory skill. Suppose a person does manage to 
recognize that something is “off” about an impression that arises on a particular occasion— say, the 
impression that nobody likes them. Simple suppression strategies might succeed in pushing the thought out 
of their mind for a moment, but thoughts such as these often immediately return. 
Now, there are more sophisticated ways to defeat such thoughts. For example, cognitive behavioral 
therapy (Aaron T Beck 1963; 1964; Aaron T. Beck 1979) trains a person to systematically challenge the 
evidential basis of problematic automatic thoughts, so that undermining these thoughts becomes routinized 
and more permanent. Advanced meditative training seeks to impart comprehensive control over how 
attention is directed and how thoughts arise (Rubia 2009). Skills such as these, however, are an achievement; 
they are attained by relatively few, and they are not something that ordinary people simply execute as a 
matter of course. Deference, vigilance failure, and lack of regulatory skill might each be considered Control 
Limiting Factors take alone. When they operate together, they surely constitute limits on one’s control.  
 
3.4. Schizophrenia  
In schizophrenia, we once again see the operation of CAPPs. According to a leading theory, the central 
cognitive/motivational alteration in schizophrenia is abnormal salience.11 Salience refers to a property of a 
stimulus to grab attention and become the target of valenced appraisal. In schizophrenia, ordinary day-to-
day stimuli acquire inappropriate hypertrophied salience: a smile by a stranger, two people coincidentally 
sharing the same name, a dog with a distinctive limp. These events are passed over in neurotypical 
individuals, but in individuals with schizophrenia, they strike the person as deeply important and self-
relevant, and they become the targets of spontaneous interpretative activity to try to make sense of them. 
Over time (typically years), ongoing interpretive activity targeting countless events and situations 
crystalizes in the formation of a delusional system, a system of internally coherent beliefs that makes sense 
of the person’s subjective experience.  
Now, for most people, the formation of odd, bizarre beliefs—ones that that are wildly out of step 
with one’s other beliefs about the world and that are not shared with others in one’s cultural milieu—are 
noticed by the person (De Neys and Glumicic 2008; Mercier 2020). This in turn generate efforts, mediated 
by executive systems (i.e., systems that implement top-down regulatory control), to challenge and correct 
the errant beliefs. Strikingly, this does not happen in schizophrenia. Thus, a second factor is likely at work: 
reduced monitoring. Ongoing surveillance of beliefs, already somewhat lax in neurotypical individuals, is 
compromised still further in schizophrenia.12 Thus, errant beliefs evade executive correction processes and 
remain in place, and over time, they become entrenched.   
In short then, schizophrenia is a disorder whose etiology is rooted in CAPPs. Abnormalities in 
salience lead to ongoing bombardment with “doxastic pulses”: spontaneous appraisals of day-to-day events 
in distorted (often paranoid) ways. Many of the Control Limiting Factors discussed earlier likely play a role 
in explaining why these pulses are not regulated: ordinary people are excessively deferent to their 
 
11 Kapur 2003; Howes and Kapur 2009. The theory actually pertains to psychosis. Schizophrenia is more complex syndrome with 
psychosis as a central element. 
12 Dopamine dysfunction provides a unifying explanation of why the two deficits are paired: midbrain dopamine pathways are 
involved in salience processing (Kapur 2003) while mesocortical dopamine pathways are involved in executive functions, which 
include monitoring (Braver, Barch, and Cohen 1999; Goldman-Rakic et al. 2004). 
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spontaneous impressions; inappropriate doxastic pulses overload executive correction mechanisms; people 
are inexpert at challenging ill-founded beliefs. And there are likely additional factors, such as impaired 
monitoring of errant beliefs, that are operative in schizophrenia specifically. 
 
 
3.5. Summing Up 
In this section, I discussed four major psychiatric disorders. My analysis of what goes on in these disorders 
had a common structure: All these disorders centrally involve chronic aberrant populations of pulses or 
CAPPs, and, in some cases, there were also inefficiencies or impairments in regulatory capacities. In each 
disorder, the disorder-associated pulses over the long-term breach certain limits of control, thus explaining 
why the person exhibits the characteristic disorder-associated symptoms. Space does not allow me to 
discuss more disorders or conditions, such as addiction, mania, or anxiety disorders. But the general form 
of how I would explain these conditions is already clear. In short then, on my view, a key feature of many 
major mental disorders is that they involve limits on control.13 
 
 
4. Preferences or Constraints Revisited 
Are mental disorders best explained in terms of limits on control, or do they reflect volition in the setting 
of extreme (and socially stigmatized) preferences? I now want to do some argument “scorekeeping” 
comparing the two views, focusing on some of Caplan’s arguments.  
 
4.1. Incentive Sensitivity and the “Gun to the Head Test” 
One of the main arguments for the volitional view involves the “gun-to-the-head-test”. Caplan, for 
example, writes:  
 
Can we change a person’s behavior purely by changing his incentives? If we can, it follows that the 
person was able to act differently all along, but preferred not to; his condition is a matter of 
preference, not constraint… (Caplan 2006, 349). 
 
Here Caplan presents crisply and succinctly what is probably the most common theme in a vast “anti-
psychiatry” literature: mental disorders involve choices that are stigmatized, but there is no genuine loss of 
control or impairments in agency.  Variants of the gun-to-the-head test (or more general incentive 
sensitivity tests) are put forward by Pickard, Hart, Heyman, Morse, Foddy & Savalescu, and many others 
(Pickard 2012; Hart 2014; Heyman 2010; Morse 2002; Foddy and Savulescu 2010).  
We are now in a position to see why conclusions based on the gun-to-the-head-test are misleading. 
In my account of mental disorders, I emphasized the role of chronic pulses, i.e., CAPPs, and I identified a 
number of Control Limiting Factors that arise specifically in that context, which in turn lead to the 
characteristic thoughts and actions we see in these disorders. The gun-to-the-head test, however, describes 
a scenario with little to no relevance to mental disorders because CAPPs are absent and none of the Control 
Limiting Factors have a chance to operate.  
 
13 This weaker claim is what I need for the present purposes in critiquing Caplan. I actually endorse a stronger view: There is a 
deep conceptual tie between mental disorder and dyscontrol, and thus all mental disorders involve limits on control. I will 
develop this view in due course, but I do not try to defend it here. 
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Consider a person with OCD. They can stop washing their hands if you put a gun to their head. But 
they still face limits on control that arise from the cumulative burden of having to regulate an unending, 
recurrent series of dysphoric urges. If you put a gun to the head of someone with ADHD, they can regulate 
a certain distracting attentional pulse (indeed they succeed at this anyways most of the time). Their problem 
is one of fallibility in the context of temporally-extended projects, and the gun-to-the-head-test has nothing 
to say about this. A person with depression can interpret a situation less negatively if you threaten them 
with certain death. But this threat is explicit and, by stipulation, definitive. In their day-to-day lives, 
however, they need to regulate ongoing negative interpretations and thoughts that lack this kind of clarity 
and certitude, allowing deference, overload, and lack of regulatory skill, among other Control Limiting Factors, 
to operate. A person with schizophrenia can be ordered under threat of serious harm to re-interpret events 
in less paranoid ways. But such interventions, if they work at all, are invariably temporary. Due to 
continued aberrant salience attribution and impaired monitoring of errant beliefs, among other Control 
Limiting Factors, spontaneous paranoid interpretations will soon return and their delusional system will be 
reinstated. 
The gun-to-the-head test initially strikes us as plausible because we have a picture that when agency 
breaks down, barriers to purposive actions are decisive, rigid, and easy to see with a quick look. For 
example, in contrasting mental illness and physical illness, Caplan notes that no incentive can get someone 
who is paralyzed to stand (Caplan 2006, 342). Here the absence of incentive sensitivity is clear with a single 
glance. Many theorists similarly seem to assume that mental disorders need to impair agency in a similarly 
decisive and easy to check way. But dyscontrol in mental disorders is, as we have seen, not much like this at 
all. It instead involves temporally extended faltering of agency due to the cumulative impact of CAPPs, with 
substantial preserved incentive sensitivity at any given slice of time.  
Now, to be absolutely clear, I am not arguing that, in contrast to physical disorders, mental 
disorders yield only weak constraints on thought and action. That is actually the opposite of my view; I 
believe mental disorders produce constraints on thought and action that are serious and severe. A person 
bombarded with obsessive thoughts of contamination and urges to hand wash is in a very real sense coerced 
(intra-psychically) into doing what they do. My point is that with mental illness, there is not one single or 
even several decisive blow that can be easily spotted, but rather countless tiny cuts that may much be harder 
to appreciate.  
 
4.2. A Unified Model of Human Behavior 
Another claimed advantage of the volitional view is that it presents a unified model of behavior. All 
purposive behavior, both healthy and disordered, is explained as arising from one’s ordinary preference-
based motivational psychology. Caplan complains that economists have been too willing to carve out a 
special exception for mental illness, as if the laws of preference-based behavior apply everywhere else but 
somehow not there. He writes:  
 
Though these authors are usually eager to bring social phenomena into the orbit of economics, they 
not only make an exception for severe mental illness; they treat the exception as uncontroversial. 
Over time, however, diagnoses of mental illness have become increasingly widespread. 
Epidemiologists now report that 20% or more of the USA population suffers from mental illness 
during a given year (Kessler et al. 1994). A seemingly small loophole in the applicability of 
economics has grown beyond recognition. 
 
The limits on control view, however, avoids Caplan’s charge because the view invokes a single model of 
motivation for all behavior, the Regulatory Control model. Most ordinary behavior arises within the 
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“regulation frontier” of the architecture: regulation works properly either because it is not needed (the 
relevant pulse states are situationally appropriate) or because it succeeds in subduing problematic pulse 
states. In some cases, the limits of control of this Regulatory Control architecture are systematically 
breached and the person regularly exhibits dyscontrol characteristic of a psychiatric illness. But there are 
not two models of behavior here. There is a single model that involves multiple parameters (e.g., efficacy of 
pulses, efficacy of regulation, etc.), and health and disease occupy different regions of the parameter space. 
Just like a model of a car engine explains both why a Mustang hums and why it sputters, the Regulatory 
Control model explains purposive agency in both health and disease. 
 
4.3. Dystonicity 
I now turn to a feature of mental illness that is hard for the volitional view to explain, but makes perfect 
sense with the limits on control model.  
Many mental disorders are “ego dystonic”: The person repudiates, rejects, or in some other way 
“stands against” their disorder-associated thoughts and actions (Freud 2014; Clark 1992; Belloch, Roncero, 
and Perpiñá 2012; Purdon et al. 2007). To be sure, some disorders are not dystonic in this way, at least 
overtly. For example, people with paranoid schizophrenia do not typically come to the doctor seeking out 
help with their delusions. But with many disorders, e.g. OCD, ADHD, and depression, people with the 
conditions actively seek out clinical care and pursue fairly demanding treatments. A natural explanation for 
why they do this is that there is something about their thoughts and actions that they dislike and want to 
change. But this natural interpretation makes little sense on the volitional view of mental illness.  
To make this point concrete, take a person with ADHD. According to supporters of the volitional 
view such as Caplan, this person most prefers to chase variety and distraction—that is why they are 
disorganized, forgetful, and scattered. If that is truly their strongest preference—that is, if their preference 
ranking really is chasing variety/distraction > being organized—then it is puzzling why they are at the clinic 
month after month working with a psychiatrist on a medication regimen and working with a behavioral 
therapist on extensive cognitive/behavioral treatments.  
Defenders of the volitional view might respond that we need to distinguish what the person herself 
prefers from societal reactions and stigma. While the person herself most prefers variety and distraction, 
she is nonetheless at the clinic to change her thoughts and actions because that is “what society demands”. 
But this response falters because it relies on an inappropriately restrictive understanding of preferences. If 
chasing variety and distraction is tightly linked to the emergence of interpersonal problems for the person, 
then we need to change the descriptions of their options to reflect this. We thus assess their preferences 
over the following “conjoined” outcomes: chasing variety/distraction and incurring interpersonal problems vs. not 
chasing variety/distraction and not incurring interpersonal problems. If the person prefers the latter, then they do 
not have a problem according to the Decision Theory model of motivation, i.e., the model that undergirds 
the volitional view. They will just straightaway not chase variety and distraction and avoid the interpersonal 
problems that would have ensued. But if they prefer the former, then we are back to our original problem: 
Why are they in the clinic week after week undertaking costly and burdensome treatments to rid 
themselves of thoughts and actions that, according to the volitional view, they actually genuinely prefer? 
The volitional view does not seem to have a good answer. 
The limits on control view, on the other hand, has a ready explanation for dystonicity. The person 
with ADHD is in the clinic week after week because she has the goal of being organized and timely and 
thereby achieving all the positive consequences that flow from that (occupational and interpersonal success, 
etc.). But she is beset by distracting attentional pulses that arise irrespective of these goals, and, though she 
can regulate many, or even most, of these attentional pulses, she cannot successfully regulate all of them—
that is, she has reached a limit on control. So, she now finds herself doing all sorts of things—for example, 
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being forgetful and disorganized—that she does not really want to do. The basic form of this explanation 
generalizes to a wide range of psychiatric disorders. In addition to OCD and depression (discussed earlier), 
it extends to other conditions, such as anxiety and addiction, where, though I did not discuss them, it is not 
hard to see how to apply the general form of this model.  
Stepping back a bit, the fundamental problem for volitional view of mental illness is that to explain 
dystonicity that clearly attends many mental disorders, we need a way for agents to regularly and 
recurrently do things that they prefer not to do, even hate to do (e.g., wash their hands for the 100th time 
or have lapses of attention for the thousandth time). The volitional view, however, relies on the Decision 
Theory model of motivation. As such, it obeys the Law of Desire, which says roughly that agents do what 
they most want to do. But by tying action so tightly to preference, this law seems to make dystonicity, 




Consumer theory distinguishes between one’s preferences, what one wants to do, and one’s budget, what 
one is able to do. The volitional view of mental illness locates mental illness on the preference side—mental 
illness involves choice rather than constraints on what one is able to do. The choices are, to be sure, sharply 
out of step with societal norms and are thus stigmatized, but they remain just that: choices.   
In responding to volitional view of mental illness, I put forward a more structured model of 
motivational architecture, one that countenances both spontaneous states as well as regulatory capacities 
that are responsive to our goals and that regulate these spontaneous states. But regulation has its limits, 
especially when it must be deployed over extended intervals of time (months and years) against massive 
populations of spontaneous tendencies to think and do various things. The existence of limits on control 
opens up space for agents to regularly and recurrently think things and do things that they themselves prefer 
not to think and do, and mental disorders, I argued, reside in this space. The constraints on thought and 
action found in mental disorders are certainly different in kind from constraints in physical conditions. They 
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